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1N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CHRISTINE E. ANDRUS, ) 
) 
Plaintiff and Respondent ) 
) 
-vs- ) Case No. 10282 
) 
IDA ALLRED, ) 
) 
Defendant and Appellant ) 
RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Respondent, by and through her attorney, Craig T. 
Vincent of the law firm of Beaslin, Nygaard, Coke & Vincent, 
petitions the Honorable Court for a rehearing on the follow-
ing grounds and allegations of error: 
I 
That the Court failed to observe legislative intent in 
construing the existence of the host-guest relationship. 
II 
That the Court failed to follow authoritative judicial 
precedent. 
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
/ / 
Craig T" Vincent 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent 
9l0 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CHR15TINE E. ANDRUS, 
Plain tiff and Respondent. 
-vs-
IDA ALLRED, 
Defendant and Appellant 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) CASE No. 10282 
) 
) 
) 
) 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THAT THE COURT FAILED TO OBSERVE LEGISLATIVE 
INTENT IN CONSTRUING THE EXISTENCE OF THE HOST-
GUEST RELATIONSHIP. 
The Utah Gue st Statute reads in part: 
"Any person who as a guest accepts a ride in any 
vehicle, moving upon any of the public highways 
of the State of Utah, and while so riding as such 
guest receives or sustains any injury. shall have 
no right of recovery against the driver. 11 
Section 41-9-1, Ut. Code Annot. 1953. 
The conditions th us required by our Legislature are: That 
a guest ( 1) Accept ::i. ride in any vehicle, (2) Moving upon 
any of the public highways, (3) Receive or sustain an injury, 
(4) While so riding as buch guest. It is the stated intent of 
the Legislature that unless all four conditions are satisfied 
by the evidence, the plaintiff is not a guest. and is not pre-
cluded from her constitutional right of action. 
\ '' ~) 
The plaintiff here contends that the injury was not 
sustained by her "while so riding" in the defendant's 
automobile, and that she is not, therefore, barred from 
a right of recovery from the defendant because of the 
latter's negligence: The defendant's automobile had con-
cluded its controlled movement, and had been parked for 
about five minutes; the driver was outside the car; the 
plaintiff was in the process of alighting therefrom; the 
ride was over; no further trip was contemplated. The 
ignoring, in the majority opinion, of these facts negating 
the requisite ingredient, constitutes an amendment to the 
Utah guest statute without benefit of legislative enactm.ent, 
and the aforesaid fourth element is stricken from the law. 
This, it is respectfully submitted, is not the province of 
this Court. 
POINT II 
THAT THE COURT FAILED TO FOLLOW AUTHORITATIVE 
JUDICIAL PRECEDENT 
The majority of the Court refused to follow the case 
of Prager v. Israel, 15 Cal. 2nd 89, 98 P2d 729, on three 
announced grounds: ( 1) That the California Court construed 
its guest statute (which is exactly identical to the Utah guest 
statute) strictly, being in derogation of the common law, 
(2) That that case was not decided until five years after the 
enactment of the Utah guest statute, and (3) That the cases 
are distinguishable on their facts. 
As pointed out in the Respondent's brief, this Court 
is called upon to construe a statute in derogation of the 
Constitution. Section 68--3-2, UCA, 1953, cited by the 
C ourl carries no mandate requiring the Court to carefully 
limit the scope of those enactments abrogating constitu-
tional rights, and is therefore here inapplicable. 
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Art. I § 11, Constitution of Utah provides: 
"All courts shall be open, and every per son, for 
an injury done to him in his person, property or 
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of 
law, which shall be administered without denial 
or unnecessary delay ... " 
The Utah guest statute not only restricts an express 
constitutional right, but it is repugnant to the stated intent 
of this State's founding fathers. 
It is suggested that a constitutional guaranty is not 
subject to modification by doubtful implication, and a 
statute purporting to alter such a relationship must be 
carefully and narrowly applied and strictly limited to its 
stated and obvious purpose. 
Secondly, the plaintiff contends that the circum-
stances of timing is not of any great impact here. Rather, 
the fact that where the high court of a sister state has 
interpreted a statute identical to that adopted by our 
Legislature, that interpretation should be seriously con-
sidered and, unless some faulty departure is discovered, 
followed. 
The final point made in the attempt to distinguish 
the cited case from the instant matter, is that the inter-
ruption in the journey was more than an hour and the 
parties had moved to the back seat. The guest statute 
gives no indication whatsoever that the Legislature 
intended the relationship to be sustained or denied upon 
any such basis. As a matter of fact, the California Court 
makes it quite obvious how they would decide the instant 
matter if it were before them: 
-4-
"(It} would be ... illogical to say that a car 
which had been parked for several hours in a 
widened space in a public highway provided for 
that purpose, and which thereafter moved a few 
inches due to defective brakes or their lack of 
application - - without a driver behind the steer-
ing wheel and without the motor having been 
started - - is 'moving on' a public highway with-
in the meaning of the statute. 
"We are likewise of the opinion that a person 
alighting from an automobile, who is in a position 
with one foot on the ground and the other on the 
running board when it so moves cannot be said to 
be 'riding' in said automobile within the meaning 
of said statute. 
"It is obvious that in order to bring the plaintiff 
within the guest statute, it would be necessary to 
so construe said statute as to omit therefrom the 
words 'moving upon' and 'while so riding'. " 
Prager v. Israel, p. 732. 
Actually, the only factual distinction of merit is that 
in the cited case the parties yet contemplated further 
journey, while here the trip was concluded and the plaintiff 
was no longer the invited guest of the defendant for the 
purpose of traveling on the public highways within the 
meaning of the guest statute. 
It is advanced that there is no favorable basis for 
refusing to adopt the holding of the Prager case. 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff respectfully submits that the lower 
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Court's decision should be affirmed upon the basis of 
legislative intent and judicial precedent. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
I 
I 
Craig T. Vincent 
/ 
/ 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent 
920 ~oston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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